The collision between the HMAS Melbourne and the HMAS Voyager, also referred to as the Melbourne-Voyager incident or the Voyager incident, was a tragic accident that occurred on February 10, 1964. The incident took place during maneuvers off Jervis Bay, involving two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN).
During the evening, the HMAS Melbourne’s aircraft were engaged in flying exercises, while the HMAS Voyager had been assigned the role of plane guard. The Voyager’s position was behind and to the left of the aircraft carrier, with the responsibility of rescuing any crew from ditching or crashing aircraft. As the two ships executed a series of turns to reverse their courses, the Voyager ended up ahead and to the right of the carrier.
Subsequently, the Voyager received orders to return to the plane guard position. This required the ship to turn to the right, moving away from the carrier, and then loop around behind it.
Instead, Voyager initiated a right turn, only to unexpectedly veer to the left. The crew on Melbourne’s bridge assumed that Voyager was maneuvering in a zig-zag pattern to allow the carrier to overtake her, and that Voyager would then resume its correct position behind Melbourne. However, recent investigations have revealed that Voyager’s officer of the watch was likely trying to align the ship to its proper station, rather than being inattentive.
Regrettably, Voyager’s abrupt turn to port came too late, resulting in an unavoidable collision. Melbourne’s bow collided with Voyager just behind the bridge, causing the destroyer to be severed in two. Out of the 314 individuals on board Voyager, 82 lost their lives, with most perishing immediately or becoming trapped in the sinking bow section. Despite sustaining damage, Melbourne managed to sail to Sydney the following morning with the majority of the survivors from Voyager.
The initial Royal Commission that investigated the collision faced criticism for unfairly assigning blame to both crews, despite evidence suggesting it was an unforeseen accident. A second Royal Commission in 1967 concluded that Voyager’s captain was unfit for command and that the original findings were based on incorrect assumptions. Nevertheless, the crews of both ships continued to bear the burden of responsibility for this tragic collision…
HMAS Melbourne, the flagship vessel of the Majestic-class light fleet aircraft carriers, epitomized a significant era of naval history. Originating from the renowned Vickers-Armstrongs shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness, England, her construction was initiated for the Royal Navy in 1943 and culminated with her majestic launch in 1945. Nevertheless, the aftermath of World War II saw a pause in her development until the strategic decision by the Australian government to procure Melbourne and her counterpart, HMAS Sydney, materialized in 1947.
To position Melbourne at the forefront of aviation advancements, extensive modifications were undertaken, transforming her into only the third aircraft carrier globally to feature an angled flight deck. With her official induction into the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) on the 28th of October, 1955, Melbourne commenced a distinguished career marked by innovation and operational excellence.
This carrier’s imposing physical dimensions, spanning a length of 701 feet 5 inches (213.79 m) and displacing a substantial 15,740 tons, underscored her formidable presence on the seas. The unparalleled speed capabilities, scaling up to 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph), further solidified Melbourne’s reputation as a maritime powerhouse. Equipped to accommodate a versatile air group comprising de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters, Melbourne’s strategic capabilities were indeed unmatched. During the meticulous 1963-1964 refurbishment cycle, she found herself under the prudent stewardship of Captain John Robertson, ushering in a new chapter of operational prowess and readiness.
The first of the Australian-built Daring-class destroyers to grace the seas was the illustrious HMAS Voyager, a pioneering vessel that proudly marked a significant milestone in Australia’s naval history. It stands out as the inaugural all-welded ship ever constructed within the Australian shores, signifying a remarkable feat in the country’s shipbuilding industry. The keel of Voyager was laid down with great anticipation and dedication on 10 October 1949 at the esteemed Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney, where skilled hands meticulously crafted its framework for years to come. By the time Voyager took its first majestic plunge into the waters on 1 May 1952, it carried with it the hopes and dreams of a nation, ready to serve the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) with honor and distinction once commissioned on 12 February 1957.
Measured at an impressive 390 feet (120 m) in length and boasting a formidable displacement of 2,800 tons (standard), Voyager commanded attention wherever it sailed, a true testament to its formidable presence on the open seas. With a remarkable maximum speed of 33 knots (61 km/h), Voyager swiftly navigated the waters, exemplifying agility and power in every voyage. Its deployment to the Far East Strategic Reserve marked a pivotal moment in its service history, as it showcased its capabilities and resilience in the face of challenges across distant seas. Upon its triumphant return to Australian waters in August 1963, Voyager underwent meticulous refitting and enhancements at the distinguished Williamstown Naval Dockyard, preparing itself for the next chapter of its illustrious journey. Under the esteemed leadership of Captain Duncan Stevens, Voyager embraced the new year of 1964 with renewed vigor and readiness, emerging from its refit stronger and more capable than ever before, poised for the adventures that awaited on the horizon.
On 9th February 1964, both vessels arrived at Jervis Bay to conduct post-refit trials. The subsequent day, the ships operated independently or engaged in exercises with the British submarine HMS Tabard. During the evening, while Melbourne was carrying out night flying exercises 20 nautical miles southeast of Jervis Bay, Voyager served as the carrier’s plane guard escort. Its primary responsibility was to rescue the crew in the event of an aircraft crash or ditching. To fulfill this duty, Voyager had to maintain a position behind and to the left of Melbourne, approximately 1,500 to 2,000 yards away. Since aircraft carriers frequently alter their course to facilitate takeoffs, the bridge team of the escorting destroyer must remain vigilant.
At the beginning, Voyager faced no difficulties in maintaining her position while the ships were maneuvering together. However, a series of course changes were initiated at 20:40 to reverse the ships’ northerly heading of 020° for flight operations, which resulted in Voyager ending up ahead and to the starboard side of Melbourne.
At 20:52, Voyager received an order to resume her plane guard station. The order was acknowledged and Voyager began turning a minute later. The expectation was for Voyager to turn away from Melbourne, make a large circle, cross the carrier’s stern, and then proceed towards Melbourne on her port side. However, Voyager unexpectedly turned to starboard and then to port. Initially, the bridge crew of Melbourne assumed that Voyager was “fishtailing” to slow down and swing behind the carrier, but Voyager did not change course again.
Recent investigations have challenged the previous understanding that the bridge crew of Voyager were distracted, with the officer of the watch and navigator focusing on navigational charts instead of maintaining awareness. Testimony from the three survivors of Voyager indicates that the officer of the watch and navigator were actively maneuvering the ship into position, with the officer continuously monitoring Melbourne through binoculars.
The alarm was raised by the port bridge lookout on Voyager as Melbourne came back into view around 20:55 after swinging back to port. Simultaneously, Melbourne’s navigation officer commanded the carrier’s engines to half speed astern, a command that Captain Robertson quickly escalated to full astern. Stevens on Voyager then ordered “Full ahead both engines. Hard a-starboard,” and directed the quartermaster to announce an imminent collision. Despite their efforts, the ships were less than 600 meters apart and could not avoid the collision just 54 seconds before impact. Recent investigations indicate that the alert time for both ships was only 40 seconds.
HMAS Melbourne en route to Sydney, immediately after the collision. The damage to the bow can be seen.
Melbourne collided with Voyager at 20:56, causing the carrier’s bow to slice into the forward superstructure of the destroyer just behind the bridge and operations room. The impact resulted in the fatalities of the senior officers on the bridge. The incoming carrier’s mass caused Voyager to roll to starboard before splitting the ship in half, with the bow sliding down Melbourne’s port side and the stern down the starboard side. Following the collision, Voyager’s forward boiler exploded, briefly igniting a fire in the exposed wreckage of the carrier’s bow before being put out by seawater. The destroyer’s forward section sank within 10 minutes due to the weight of the two 4.5-inch (110 mm) gun turrets. The aft section began sinking half an hour after the collision and fully submerged at 00:18. Upon receiving messages at Fleet Headquarters in Sydney, Robertson inaccurately assessed the damage to Voyager, resulting in the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island being cleared of the troopship HMAS Sydney to accommodate Voyager. Additionally, the salvage ship HMAS Kimbla was dispatched to tow the destroyer to Sydney.
Melbourne collided with Voyager at 20:56, causing the carrier’s bow to slice into the forward superstructure of the destroyer just behind the bridge and operations room. The impact resulted in the fatalities of the senior officers on the bridge. The incoming carrier’s mass caused Voyager to roll to starboard before splitting the ship in half, with the bow sliding down Melbourne’s port side and the stern down the starboard side. Following the collision, Voyager’s forward boiler exploded, briefly igniting a fire in the exposed wreckage of the carrier’s bow before being put out by seawater. The destroyer’s forward section sank within 10 minutes due to the weight of the two 4.5-inch (110 mm) gun turrets. The aft section began sinking half an hour after the collision and fully submerged at 00:18. Upon receiving messages at Fleet Headquarters in Sydney, Robertson inaccurately assessed the damage to Voyager, resulting in the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island being cleared of the troopship HMAS Sydney to accommodate Voyager. Additionally, the salvage ship HMAS Kimbla was dispatched to tow the destroyer to Sydney.
Melbourne promptly deployed its boats immediately after the collision to rescue survivors, and the carrier’s wardroom and C Hangar were prepared to handle casualties. One cutter managed to save 40 individuals before it started taking on water. Leading Seaman M. A. W. Riseley, in command of the cutter, valiantly rescued as many survivors as possible despite the weight restrictions of the rescue boat. The admiral’s barge suffered damage from debris. Initially, eight helicopters were launched, but due to safety concerns in the confined area, the number was reduced to two at a time. Many sailors in the water were either unable or unwilling to be rescued using the helicopters’ winches, so the helicopters were reassigned to provide illumination with their landing lights. At 21:58, Melbourne received information that five minesweepers, two search-and-rescue boats from HMAS Creswell, and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra had been dispatched. Air Nymph, arriving just before 22:00, collected 34 survivors and attempted to transfer them to Melbourne. However, the boat was pushed up under the carrier’s flight deck by swells, causing damage to two communications aerials. Consequently, the SAR boat returned to Creswell to offload the survivors. Air Sprite recovered an additional 36 survivors and transported them ashore. Sea searches continued until February 12th, and aircraft periodically flew over the area until February 14th in search of bodies.
Out of the 314 individuals on board Voyager during the collision, a total of 14 officers, 67 sailors, and one civilian dockyard worker tragically lost their lives. This devastating incident claimed the lives of Stevens and nearly all the bridge crew sailors, leaving only two survivors. The majority of the casualties were located in the forward section of Voyager, where they were off duty, relaxing, or sleeping at the time of the collision. The recovery efforts managed to retrieve only three bodies, one of which belonged to Stevens. These brave individuals were laid to rest on 14 February, while the remaining missing personnel were officially declared deceased on 17 February. On 21 February, memorial services were conducted throughout Australia to honor the fallen. Thankfully, there were no casualties reported aboard Melbourne.
After the Voyager survivors had settled in for the night at 03:00, and the forward collision bulkheads had been thoroughly examined and reinforced, Robertson relinquished command of the search operation to Stuart and set course for Sydney. Meanwhile, Melbourne was undergoing repairs to her damaged bow at Cockatoo Island Dockyard, which were successfully completed by May 1964. The ship remained in active duty with the RAN until 1982, before being sold for scrap to China in 1985.
In the aftermath of the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America extended offers to lend ships to the RAN as replacements. The Royal Navy proposed the HMS Duchess, a Daring-class destroyer, while the United States Navy offered two Fletcher-class destroyers: the USS The Sullivans and the USS Twining. The RAN accepted the offer for Duchess, which underwent modernization before entering RAN service. Although initially planned for a four-year tenure, Duchess remained in service until 1977 after being sold to the RAN. Additionally, the RAN commissioned the construction of two enhanced River-class destroyer escorts (British Type 12 frigates), based on the design of the Leander-class frigate. Swan and Torrens were both commissioned in 1970 and 1971 respectively.
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